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PUBLIC OPTIONS: THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM CARE, ITS 
COSTS, AND GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THEM 
“Life would be infinitely happier if we could only be born at the age of 
eighty, and gradually approach eighteen.”—Mark Twain1 
There is a profound moment in a person’s life when the thought of 
growing old becomes real.  With that moment comes the sadness of 
knowing that you are running out of time, that life is surprisingly short, and 
that there is no going back.  Time seems to have vanished.  Naturally, 
people cope with this moment in different ways.  Some deny old age and go 
on living as though they are ageless.  Others embrace the possibility of 
being an Elder and having the wisdom that comes only with age.  Many 
people simply try to make the most of it, and look forward to retirement as a 
time of relaxation and reflection.  A universal truth is that humans have a 
natural desire to live, and to live as long as they can, and as time marches 
on this becomes more and more difficult.  We see ourselves getting old, but 
do not (or refuse to) fully see the price of age.  Our bodies pay that price, 
and, unfortunately, so do our minds.  The human desire to live has found 
new zeal in modern medicine, which has expanded the average life span by 
nearly two decades since 1900.2  As more and more of us live longer, more 
and more of us are paying that price of age. 
Because of longer life spans, we have time to plan for the end of life, 
and this is where things get complicated.  People do not want to envision 
themselves at the end of their lives sitting in a wheelchair in the common 
area of a nursing home, idle, impoverished, half-mad, and at the mercy of 
meagerly-paid staff who must take care of your every need, including your 
diet, hygiene, and even the position in which you sleep.  Many of these 
conditions are ones reserved in our society for felons and the criminally 
insane.  It is only natural for people to reject the notion of living in this state.  
We would rather spend our final years at home.3  Therefore, as a nation, we 
 
 1. WILLIAM LYON PHELPS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY WITH LETTERS 965 (1939). 
 2. Elizabeth Arias, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., United States Life Tables, 2006, 58 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 21, 2010 at 4. 
 3. Robert W. Stock, Health Care Reform Will Impact Long-Term Care, AOL NEWS (Mar. 
26, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/healthcare/article/few-know-health-care-law-
has-class/19413357 (“Surveys show that 90 percent of Americans want to age at home.”) 
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do not sufficiently plan for a time when we may have to live in a nursing 
home. 
Roughly one-third of Americans will spend some time in a nursing home 
during their lives.4  The cost of living in a nursing home is catastrophic for 
the average middle class American: $72,000 per year.5  Assisted living 
environments, which provide long-term care at a less-intense level, cost 
$38,000 per year.6  Although only 14% of long-term care recipients live in 
these institutions, the cost to care for them makes up 70% of all of the 
money spent on long-term care in the United States.7  The other 86% of 
long-term care recipients, comprised of disabled children and adults, as well 
as some elderly persons, receive their care in the home.8  Obviously, long-
term care in the home is far less expensive than institutionalized care.  
However, due to the high costs of institutionalized care, a lack of planning 
by Americans to properly finance their own long-term care, and a 
government-bias in favor of nursing homes, the costs of long-term care 
threatens to become one of our society’s greatest burdens in the coming 
decades. 
Much has been said about gridlock in Washington.  The two political 
parties seem locked in a perpetual state of fighting, at the expense of 
allowing long-term problems to fester to crisis levels.  Funding of long-term 
care, however, has received some attention, and there is at least a 
consensus in the American political establishment that the future of long-
term care funding is a problem.9  Pieces of legislation from both 
Republicans and Democrats have demonstrated a desire to address the 
issue.10  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”) included a lengthy 
 
 4. Gary A. Simon, Can Long-Term Care Insurance Be Fixed?, J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Fall 
2010, at 51, 51. 
 5. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 2186-07, MEDICAID AND LONG-
TERM CARE SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2010) [hereinafter KFF MEDICAID LTC], available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/2186-07.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE BOOMERS: A PUBLIC 
POLICY CHALLENGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (1991); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-06-401, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: FEDERAL PROGRAM COMPARED FAVORABLY 
WITH OTHER PRODUCTS, AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS TREND COULD INFORM FUTURE DECISIONS 1 
(2006); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY ix, xi 
(2004). 
 10. See 124 Stat. 119 442-54 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 30011); see also 
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 54-155 (2005) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396); see also Dems Offer Mixed Views on CLASS Act’s Demise, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2011/ 
October/27/class-act.aspx.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was amended by 
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number of provisions limiting Medicaid eligibility and encouraging home 
and community-based care over more costly nursing home care.11  The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)12, however, was far 
more sweeping.  Among other provisions, it established the Community 
Living Assistance Services and Support (CLASS) Act.13  CLASS was going to 
be the first government-sponsored long-term care insurance policy.14  It was 
unique.  Unlike Medicare, which is funded by mandatory payroll taxes, 
CLASS was to be funded by voluntary payroll taxes.15  Unlike Medicaid, 
which is taxpayer-funded, CLASS was to be funded almost-exclusively by 
these voluntary premiums.16  Unlike private health insurance, CLASS 
enrollees would not be denied coverage once they were vested and had the 
requisite number of functional limitations to qualify for the benefit.17 
Although CLASS was designed to expand the number of Americans 
covered by non-Medicaid long-term care insurance, it was set up in a way 
that made it very difficult, if not impossible, to remain a fiscally solvent 
program without an alternative source of funding.  Consequently, in 
October 2011, the Obama Administration announced that it was 
abandoning the CLASS program.18  This article will show that there is 
certainly a need for a program like CLASS; however, under its current 
structure, the CLASS program could not have realistically remained fiscally 
solvent.  Therefore, to reach the goals that CLASS was designed to achieve, 
the government must either make participation in the program mandatory or 
require that all Americans purchase private long-term care insurance.  
Failure by the government to take decisive action, and instead to continue to 
take the approach seen in the DRA, could allow an already-serious fiscal 
problem to grow into a crisis for both the public and private sectors. 
 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010).  These two laws will be hereinafter cited together as “ACA.” 
 11. See DRA, 120 Stat. at 54-155. 
 12. See ACA § 2406. 
 13. See ACA § 8002 (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 30011); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., A REPORT ON THE ACTUARIAL, MARKETING, AND LEGAL ANALYSES OF THE CLASS 
PROGRAM 1 (2011) [hereinafter HHS CLASS REPORT]. 
 14. See John Inglehart, Long-Term Care Legislation At Long Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF., 8 
(2010). 
 15. See HHS CLASS REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 1-2, 30. 
 18. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Congress (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/letter10142011.html; 
see also Scott Spoerry, Obama Drops Long-Term Health Care Program, CNN POLITICS (OCT. 
14, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-14/politics/politics_health-care-program_1_long 
-term-care-sebelius-community-living-assistance-services?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
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I.  THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM CARE 
Unlike other areas of health care, the vast majority of long-term care in 
the United States, whether it is in skilled nursing facilities, assisted living, or 
in-home care, is funded by the federal government and the states.  This is a 
unique area of the healthcare industry, as the private insurance industry 
accounts for only 9% of its funding.19  Another one-fifth of funding is paid 
out-of-pocket by private citizens.20  Twenty-three percent of funding comes 
from Medicare, which covers “post-acute care through its skilled nursing 
facility benefit and its home health care benefit.”21  This coverage fully 
terminates after a maximum period of 100 days.22  The only other source 
left is Medicaid, the government’s health insurance program for the poor.  
Over half of long-term care coverage for periods exceeding 100 days, 23 
and 80% of coverage exceeding three years,24 comes from Medicaid.  
Therefore, in the world of long-term care, federal and state governments 
play much more important roles, and have much greater responsibilities, in 
ensuring that long-term care is both available for their citizens and 
affordable for their taxpayers.  Medicaid is financed through a federal-state 
matching fund system.25  The amount of money that a state pays for 
Medicaid is matched by the federal government at a set rate called the 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”).26  The rate is designed to 
provide a matching fund appropriate to each state’s level of per capita 
income with the overall goal of achieving a funding system that distributes 
the financing of Medicaid at a relatively equal level, with a slightly greater 
share of spending made by the federal government in each state.27 
Since its inception in 1965, Medicaid has always covered long-term 
care in skilled nursing homes.28  It has covered care at the intermediate level 
 
 19. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE COVERAGE OF SKILLED NURSING FACILITY CARE 3 (2007). 
 23. Melissa Baum & Jason A. Frank, Level of Care Standard: Maryland Medical 
Assistance Long-Term Care & Medical Eligibility Issues, MD. BAR J., March/April 2008, at 45, 
46; KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1 (51% of the remaining market share after removing 
Medicare). 
 24. H. Stephen Kaye et al., Long-Term Care: Who Gets It, Who Provides It, Who Pays, 
and How Much?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 11, 11, 17 (2010). 
 25. VICTORIA WACHINO ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 7000, 
FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS 3 
(2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Financing-the-Medicaid-Program-
The-Many-Roles-of-Federal-and-State-Matching-Funds-Policy-Brief.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Baum & Frank, supra note 23, at 46. 
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(assisted living and residential care facilities) since the 1970’s,29 and has 
allowed states to cover home and community-based care through a waiver 
system since 1981.30  Since it is designed to cover the poor, Medicaid 
applicants must meet a number of eligibility factors before qualifying for 
long-term care coverage.  Eligibility requirements can vary significantly in 
each state.  For example, thirty-eight states require a level of income at or 
below 300% of SSI.31  Another ten states have lower thresholds, and two 
states have no income limits.32  Resource guidelines vary as well, but are 
generally strict: although a homestead is usually exempt in the eligibility 
determination,33 in most states a single person or a married couple can 
have no more than $2,000–$3,000 in assets.34  Countable assets can 
include a variety of personal possessions: all liquid resources (cash, stocks, 
bonds, IRAs, etc.), burial lots with the exception of lots being used for the 
applicant’s personal burial, extra vehicles, rental property, life insurance 
cash surrender value, jewelry, and even furniture in storage.35  If an 
applicant has transferred any of these types of resources to a third-party 
(other than a spouse) within five years of applying for Medicaid, she or he 
may be denied nursing home or home and community-based (“HCB”) care 
coverage for a certain period of time.36  Therefore, to finally get to a point 
at which Medicaid will cover a person’s nursing home stay or HCB care, 
that person must become impoverished, either through five or more years of 
continuous poverty or by spending down resources until they become 
sufficiently scarce to meet the guidelines.  The result is a long-term care 
population, the majority of which is impoverished. 
The demand for long-term care is already increasing.37  First, it should 
be noted that there is a vast population of unpaid caretakers in this country.  
There are 9.9 million Americans receiving no compensation for caring for 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 47. 
 31. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, NO. 8048, MEDICAID FINANCIAL 
ELIGIBILITY: PRIMARY PATHWAYS FOR THE ELDERLY AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2010) 
[hereinafter KFF MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/up 
load/8048.pdf. 
 32. Id. (stating Missouri and Indiana have no income limits). 
 33. Id. (stating homesteads are exempt up to $500,000 in equity in most states). 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. The definition of assets is determined by each state individually.  See generally MO. 
CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-2.030 (2006) (outlining the types of assets that may be 
considered in eligibility determinations). 
 36. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 2. 
 37. DANIEL I. SHOSTAK & PAUL A. LONDON, STRATEGIC AFFAIRS FORECASTING, STATE 
MEDICAID EXPENDITURES FOR LONG-TERM CARE 2008-2027, at 3, 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?docid=24597. 
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the Alzheimer’s disease and dementia-suffering population alone.38  The 
existence of such a population is likely to increase with the need for long-
term care, creating an entire sector of the public that works in a capacity of 
“voluntary servitude (albeit for loved ones)” for little or no real 
compensation.  The implications this situation has for the demand for public 
assistance, lack of productivity, and a decreased quality of life are obvious.  
Taxpayers fare no better.  Nursing home coverage is the fastest growing 
area of Medicaid coverage,39 and is likely to increase at a faster rate than 
“all health care expenditures, Medicare, Medicaid, and the national Gross 
Domestic Product.”40 
Even in the most optimistic . . . scenario, which assumes that disability rates 
fall by 1 percent per year, the size of the disabled population will grow by 
more than 50 percent between 2000 and 2040 and the number of disabled 
older adults for every adult age 25 to 64 will increase.41 
A doubling of long-term care expenditures, combined with expected 
increases in Medicare and Social Security spending over the same period of 
time, could become a catastrophic burden on the public sector.  Moreover, 
when we consider that an additional one-fifth of long-term care spending is 
paid out-of-pocket by private individuals,42 long-term care could become a 
tremendous financial burden on all Americans, and will consume a larger 
and larger portion of the nation’s wealth. 
II.  ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 
In the years preceding the ACA, a number of laws enacted were 
designed to promote the use of private long-term care insurance.  Section 
6021 of the DRA attempts to expand the State Long-Term Care Partnership 
Program.43  In participating states, Medicaid applicants who own long-term 
care policies are allowed an asset disregard equal to the amount of long-
term care benefits received under the policy.44  “For example, if a person 
uses $50,000 of insurance coverage, the same amount of assets (up to the 
policy maximum) would be disregarded if that person applies for 
 
 38. ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2009 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 33 (2009). 
 39. SHOSTAK & LONDON, supra note 37, at 3. 
 40. Id. 
 41. CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE FIN. & ORG. INITIATIVE (HCFO), ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., FINDINGS BRIEF: MEETING THE FUTURE LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS OF THE BABY BOOMERS 3 
(2007). 
 42. KFF MEDICAID LTC, supra note 5, at 1. 
 43. Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6021, 120 Stat. 4, 68 
(2006). 
 44. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE ON LONG-TERM 
CARE PARTNERSHIP POLICIES, available at http://www.doi.ne.gov/ltcare/partnership_policies.pdf. 
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Medicaid.”45  The DRA requires all states to honor “partnership policies” 
owned by Medicaid applicants from a partnership state, as long as the 
states involved have a reciprocity agreement with each other at the time the 
individual applies for Medicaid in the “non-partnership” state.46  As a result 
of this provision, most states are now participating in the long-term care 
partnership program.47  Section 6021 also establishes the creation of a 
national clearinghouse for long-term care information, designed to inform 
consumers on the availability and limits of Medicaid long-term care 
coverage, provide “objective information” to help consumers decide 
whether to purchase private long-term care insurance policies, and maintain 
a list of states that have long-term care partnership programs.48  Moreover, 
since 2005 the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) has 
promoted the purchase of private long-term care insurance through its 
Long-Term Care Campaign, the goal of which is “to increase consumer 
awareness about, and planning ahead for, long-term care.”49 
The DRA contained a number of provisions designed to discourage 
people from using Medicaid to pay for long-term care (presumably with the 
secondary intention of promoting the use of private policies and out-of-
pocket spending).  In fact, over 40% of the text of the DRA is dedicated to 
changes in Medicaid eligibility rules.50  Sections 6011 and 6016 involve 
penalties for applicants who transfer assets in order to qualify for Medicaid 
coverage.51  Instead of looking back thirty-six months, state agencies are 
now required to look back sixty months from the month of application to 
determine if any transfers of assets occurred.52  A penalty applies to transfers 
in which the applicant received less than the fair market value for the 
asset.53  For example, if a person signs a quitclaim deed to a friend for real 
property, essentially giving the property away, the fair market value of that 
property would be the amount of the penalty.  If the property is assessed to 
be worth $9,000, the penalty would be that amount divided by “the average 
 
 45. David G. Stevenson et al., The Complementarity of Public and Private Long-Term 
Care Coverage, 29 HEALTH AFF. 96, 99 (2010). 
 46. DRA § 6021. 
 47. Stevenson et al., supra note 45, at 99. 
 48. DRA § 6021. 
 49. Long-Term Care Awareness Campaign: Own Your Future, AGING & DISABILITY 
RESOURCE CENTER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EXCHANGE, 1, http://www.adrc-tae.org/tiki-down 
load_file.php?fileId=1956 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011); see also U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., National Clearinghouse for Long-Term Care Information, LONGTERMCARE.GOV, 
http://www.longtermcare.gov/LTC/Main_Site/Index.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). 
 50. See generally DRA. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(D)(ii), 1396(H) (2006). 
 52. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 53. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(A). 
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monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility services in the state . . . at 
the time of application.”54  Therefore, if the average monthly cost is $3,000, 
the person would not be able to use Medicaid to pay for nursing home 
coverage for three months.  Under previous law, this transfer penalty period 
began the first day after the month the transfer occurred.55  The DRA 
changed the penalty period to begin on the first day of the month of 
application or the first day of the month after the transfer, whichever is 
later.56  States are also empowered to combine penalty periods for different 
transfers into one period covering all of them.57  Although a somewhat 
morbid thought, creating longer, continuous transfer periods saves 
governments money, since it increases the likelihood that a resident will no 
longer be a nursing home resident by the time the transfer period expires.  
Medicaid applicants who attempt to transfer assets by “loaning” the money 
are also subject to more restrictions.  Any loan that they issue must be 
actuarially sound, provide for equal payments with no balloon payments 
allowed, and prohibit the cancellation of the debt upon the death of the 
lender.58  Finally, the purchase of a life estate in another individual’s home 
is now considered a transfer of property unless the purchaser resides in that 
home for at least a year after the sale.59 
Section 6012 limits eligibility for clients who have annuities.60  
Regardless of whether the applicant receives income from the annuity,61 the 
entire value of this asset counts as a resource (note that the Medicaid 
resource maximum for a single person is usually no more than $2,000)62 
unless it meets some very specific requirements.  First, the state must be 
named the “remainder beneficiary” of the annuity to allow the state to 
recover any Medicaid expenditures it may make on behalf of the 
annuitant.63  The state becomes a secondary beneficiary to the annuity if the 
Medicaid recipient has a spouse living in the community or a disabled child 
designated as a beneficiary in the annuity.64  If either of these parties 
attempts to transfer or dispose of the proceeds from the annuity for less than 
 
 54. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)(II). 
 55. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(i). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2006). 
 57. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(H)(i)-(ii). 
 58. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(I)(i)-(iii). 
 59. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(J). 
 60. Id. § 1396p(e)(1). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) (2006); Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
171, § 6012(d), 120 Stat. 4, 64 (2006). 
 62. KFF MEDICAID FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY, supra note 31, at 5. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) (2006). 
 64. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(ii). 
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fair market value, the state becomes the primary beneficiary.65  Second, the 
annuity must be irrevocable and non-assignable, meaning that it cannot be 
cashed out or transferred.66  Third, the annuity must be actuarially sound in 
accordance with the requirements of Office of Chief Actuary of the Social 
Security Administration.67  Finally, the annuity must provide regular income 
in equal amounts to the annuitant, with no deferrals and no balloon 
payments allowed.68  Individual Retirement Annuities under Section 408(b) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, or Deemed IRAs under “Qualified Employer 
Plans” under Section 408(q) are also not counted as resources.69  If the 
annuity does not count as a resource, the income stream from the annuity 
counts as unearned income toward the applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid.  
These provisions tighten the ability of an applicant to shelter his assets by 
organizing them into an annuity, thus converting the assets into income.70 
If the annuity does not count as a resource, the income stream from the 
annuity counts as unearned income toward the applicant’s eligibility for 
Medicaid.  These provisions tighten the ability of an applicant to shelter 
one’s assets by organizing them into an annuity, thus converting the assets 
into income.71  Section 6013 affects the “Income-First Rule,” which is used 
by many states to determine the portion of income and resources from an 
institutionalized Medicaid recipient that can be allotted to one’s spouse 
remaining in the community.  A primary purpose of this provision is to allow 
the institutionalized spouse to receive Medicaid while not impoverishing the 
community spouse (a problem known as ‘spousal impoverishment’).72  To 
receive an income allotment, the community spouse’s income must be 
below a certain level.73  The community spouse’s total share of the couple’s 
resources must also remain below a limit known as the Community Spouse 
Resource Allowance (“CRSA”), which, due to automatic adjustments, can be 
as high as $100,000.74  Any amount of resources over the CRSA counts 
against the institutionalized spouse.75  In income-first states, if the 
 
 65. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i). 
 66. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(I). 
 67. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(II). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(III) (2006). 
 69. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(i)(I). 
 70. The Section 6012 provisions have been limited in scope by recent court decisions.  
E.g., Lopes v. Starkowski, No. 3:10-CV-307 (JCH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81829, at *6-7 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 11, 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006). 
 73. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006). 
 74. Id. § 1396r-5(f)(2); see also Sandra L. Smith, 2011 Elder Law Numbers, LEXISNEXIS 
COMMUNITIES: EST. PRAC. & ELDER LAW COMMUNITY (Jan. 14, 2011, 3:55 PM), 
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(1)-(2) (2006). 
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community spouse’s income is below a certain amount, he or she may be 
able to retain more resources than the CRSA usually allows.76  The changes 
in section 6013 require that the community spouse’s allotment be 
determined before considering one’s resource allowance.77  Therefore, it is 
more difficult for Medicaid applicants to shelter their resources through their 
spouse. 
Section 6014 puts restrictions on the “homestead exemption.”78  
Traditionally, a person’s home and the surrounding property do not count 
as a resource against Medicaid eligibility.  This section provides that, once a 
person’s equity in his or her home exceeds $500,000, the homestead 
counts as a resource.79  States are given the option of increasing this limit to 
no more than $750,000.80  Starting in 2011, this limit will adjust with the 
Consumer Price Index “to the nearest $1,000.”81  Section 6032 requires 
that any provider that gets at least $5 million per year in Medicaid payments 
must create written policies for its employees and contractors addressing 
Medicaid fraud and whistleblower protections.82  Section 6034 established 
the Medicaid Integrity Program, designed to create a dedicated government 
entity that regularly reviews and audits Medicaid-receiving providers to 
ensure that they comply with the law.83  The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) defines its role under the Medicaid Integrity 
Program as twofold: 
To hire contractors to review Medicaid provider activities, audit claims, 
identify overpayments, and educate providers and others on Medicaid 
program integrity issues [and] [t]o provide effective support and assistance 
to States in their efforts to combat Medicaid provider fraud and abuse.84 
 
 76. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICAID & STATE OPERATIONS, 
SECTIONS 6011 AND 6016: NEW MEDICAID TRANSFER OF ASSET RULES UNDER THE DEFICIT 
REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, at 19 (2006), available at http://www.canhr.org/medcal/PDFs/TOA 
Enclosure.pdf ; see also The Impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 on Medi-Cal for Long-
Term Care , CAL. ADVOC. FOR NURSING HOME REF., http://www.canhr.org/newsroom/newdev_ 
archive/past/20060331_DFRA_analysis.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(6) (2006). 
 78. Id. § 1396p(f). 
 79. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(A). 
 80. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(B). 
 81. Id. § 1396p(f)(1)(C). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(68)(A)-(C) (2006); see also The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: 
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These sections also include anti-fraud provisions that restrict deceptive 
practices by pharmacies,85 require providers to report more information 
about their patients and claims,86 and require Medicaid applicants to 
provide proof of identity and citizenship.87 
This laundry list of reforms was intended to reduce the number of long-
term care recipients receiving Medicaid, and promote the expansion of the 
private long-term care insurance industry.  The DRA was modestly successful 
in increasing the number of Medicaid long-term care recipients receiving 
cheaper home and community-based care as opposed to nursing home 
care.88  However, these initiatives have had little to no impact on the sale of 
long-term care policies, which “have been flat or down” since the DRA was 
passed.89  In 2006, the Lifespan Respite Care Act authorized HHS to award 
grants and “cooperative agreements” to state agencies for programs that 
“expand and enhance respite care services to family caregivers” and 
improve access to and coordination of these services.90  Respite care 
services are designed to assist in-home caregivers, many of whom are 
unpaid, by providing care to allow the caregiver time away from his or her 
responsibilities.  Although a relatively small piece of legislation, the Lifespan 
Respite Care Act does acknowledge the ever-growing population of unpaid 
caregivers who fill the void caused by the insufficient presence of long-term 
care insurance in the United States.91  It is clear, however, that laws like the 
DRA, which attempt to reduce reliance on Medicaid in favor of private 
insurance by limiting Medicaid eligibility requirements, are ineffective.  
Legislators would be wise to study the fundamental challenges facing the 
long-term care insurance industry, which go far deeper than anything the 
DRA attempted to address. 
III.  CHALLENGES TO THE PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Americans are woefully unprepared to pay for their own long-term care 
coverage.  In a 2001 survey, only one-fourth of Americans age 45 and over 
 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10)(D) (2006). 
 86. Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(I)(i). 
 87. Id. § 1396b(x). 
 88. AVALERE HEALTH LLC, MEDICAID-FINANCED HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 
RESEARCH / A SYNTHESIS 2 (2007), available at http://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/fund 
ing/Documents/HCBS_Research_Synthesis.pdf. 
 89. HOWARD GLECKMAN, THE URBAN INST., LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING REFORM: LESSONS 
FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD 20 (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/ 
media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Feb/1368_Gleckman_longterm_care_financi
ng_reform_lessons_US_abroad.pdf. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 300ii-1(a) (2006). 
 91. GLECKMAN, supra note 89, at 1. 
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could identify the cost of nursing home care within a range of 20%.92  
Three-fourths of them mistakenly believed that Medicare either covers 
assisted living expenses or did not know whether it did or not.93  This chronic 
lack of preparedness increases the likelihood that, when these Americans 
need long-term care, they will also need Medicaid, and need it for a longer 
period of time.  On its face, private long-term care insurance is more 
desirable than Medicaid.  Private policies generally pay more than 
Medicaid, so nursing homes benefit from them.94  Also, if a person has 
private coverage, it is less likely he will need Medicaid, which saves taxpayer 
dollars.  A person does not necessarily have to impoverish herself to use 
private long-term care insurance. 
Scholars have found a diverse array of reasons why Americans avoid 
getting long-term care insurance.  Part of the problem is the way long-term 
care insurance is structured.  The typical health insurance policy covers most 
of the care a person receives, whether it is preventive care, hospital or 
emergency room treatment, tests, etc. (after any deductibles and co-pays 
that may apply).  Long-term care, however, is a different phenomenon.  It 
involves the need for daily care that can last for years, may not be necessary 
for decades, and that can take a variety of forms, including personal 
hygiene care, ambulatory care, and even housekeeping.  Therefore, a 
person cannot approach a long-term care insurance policy from the 
perspective that it will cover all of her needs.95  Long-term care benefits 
consist of cash payments, paid out daily or weekly, that can range from 
$50-$400 per day.96  A more expensive indemnity policy allows the 
policyholder to spend the benefit money on whatever care is most 
appropriate for her (including reimbursement to unpaid caretakers).  A less-
expensive reimbursement policy restricts the type of care on which the 
benefit can be spent, and requires the policyholder to pay for the care up 
front and get reimbursed later.97  Most policies have a deductible, or an 
“elimination cost.”98  Before benefits are activated, the policyholder must 
pay for her long-term care out-of-pocket for a designated time period, often 
sixty to ninety days.99  Based on today’s numbers, this can total over 
 
 92. AM. ASS’N OF RETIRED PERS., THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
VERSUS REALITY 8 (2001) [hereinafter AARP]. 
 93. Id. at 36. 
 94. Simon, supra note 4, at 53. 
 95. Simon, supra note 4, at 57. 
 96. LTC Insurance Basics, LONG TERM CARE INS. NAT’L ADVISORY, http://longtermcareinsur 
ance.org/longtermcareinsurance.html#gpm1_3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2011). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Simon, supra note 4, at 57. 
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$10,000.100  However, since a policyholder can pay premiums for decades 
before actually using the benefit, inflation plays a much more important 
role.  For example, a ninety-day elimination cost that is projected to cost 
$18,000 when a policy is opened may end up costing over $40,000 by the 
time the benefits are actually needed.101  To address this problem, long-term 
care policies come with inflation protection that, in exchange for a higher 
premium, increases the benefit amount according to a certain rate of 
inflation established when the policy was purchased.102  Long-term care 
insurance policies are usually time-limited, but more costly policies can be 
purchased that provide perpetual coverage.103  Naturally, premium amounts 
vary, but as a result of this unique structure the average monthly premium is 
around $200.104  This is a significant amount of money for the average 
middle-class American, many of whom simply cannot afford to pay it.  A 
1993 survey indicated that 91% of Americans who did not have long-term 
care insurance said it was too expensive.105  Another study indicates that, 
due to difficulties involved with anticipating inflation in medical costs, 
adverse selection,106 and “imperfect competition” from Medicaid and other 
alternatives to conventional long-term care,107 insurance premiums are 
“marked up about 18 cents per dollar of premium above actuarially fair 
levels” for people who buy a policy and keep it until they die.108  Another 
possible reason why Americans tend to avoid private long-term care 
insurance may include a belief that their families will provide long-term care 
for them, and they are either ignorant of indemnity policies that provide 
cash benefits that can be used to reimburse caretaker relatives or feel the 
policies are too expensive to be justifiable in light of these alternatives.109 
More recent research suggests that a person is better off saving her 
money than putting it into long-term care insurance.  For example, a 60-
year-old paying $2,500 per year in premiums for long-term care insurance 
 
 100. Id. at 58. 
 101. Id. (according to a 3% annual inflation rate and policy coverage that grows at 5% per 
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 104. Id. at 58. 
 105. PIERRE PESTIEAU & GRÉGORY PONTHIÈRE, CTR. FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND 
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 106. See infra pp. 16-17. 
 107. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Medicaid Crowd-Out of Private Long-Term Care Insurance 
Demand: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey, 21 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 4-5 
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can make three times the amount in benefits she will receive under the 
policy by simply investing the money in a tax-free IRA instead.110  Instead of 
being subjected to restrictions from the insurance company, the invested 
money can be spent in any way the person wants. 
The premium problem is part of a larger challenge faced by the private 
long-term care insurance industry called adverse selection.  Adverse 
selection occurs when there are too many high-risk enrollees and not 
enough low-risk enrollees.111  The private insurance industry relies on low-
risk policyholders for its very survival.  The time-honored tradition of 
underwriting “enables these insurers to determine eligibility for coverage and 
charge premiums that are in line with the risk.”112  Therefore, low-risk 
individuals are encouraged to buy policies because of the prospect of a 
reasonable premium, while high-risk individuals are compelled to pay a 
higher premium or risk going without coverage.113  The insurance policy 
becomes profitable because the premium income from the low-risk enrollees 
is higher than benefits that are paid out.  Some insurance companies even 
drop enrollees if they feel they have become too much of a risk.114  This has 
become a somewhat common practice in the private health insurance 
industry, and it was targeted by the ACA.115  However, the ACA takes into 
account the adverse effects of banning this policy and replaces it with the 
coverage mandate.116  It has no such provisions concerning long-term care 
coverage.  Underwriting is frequently used in the long-term care insurance 
industry, but is less effective due to the lack of demand for coverage in the 
United States117  Numerous studies have shown that adverse selection is a 
particularly acute problem for the long-term care insurance industry.118  
People who buy long-term care policies “have a higher probability of 
becoming disabled than those who do not.”119  Conversely, people who 
terminate their policies have a lower risk of becoming disabled.120  The 
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bottom line is that, to prevent adverse selection, a self-sustaining insurance 
policy that is voluntary must have a mechanism for both attracting enrollees 
and managing risk, either through an underwriting system or by limiting the 
number of enrollees.  If the policy guarantees coverage for anyone willing to 
pay a premium, then it must find a way to counter-balance this risk by 
becoming mandatory.121  This is an unusually difficult problem for long-term 
care insurance policies in the United States. 
Also, unlike conventional health insurance, there is no guarantee that 
long-term care insurance will ever be needed, which encourages denial and 
use of potential premium dollars in alternative ways.  “[D]enial of the risk of 
a potentially far-off event causes many healthy individuals to see little value 
in purchasing and paying premiums on LTC coverage.”122  The level of 
uncertainty and the cost of the insurance are high enough to generate a lot 
of doubt in Americans’ minds. In a recent study, it was found that, when it 
comes to long-term care insurance, people consider trade-offs that are 
more profound than they would when considering health or auto 
insurance.123  For example, someone may be choosing between paying for 
long-term care insurance and putting enough money away for retirement.124  
Others, who would rather leave a legacy to their heirs than pay for long-
term care insurance, decide to use potential premium money toward a life 
insurance policy instead.125  Although most Americans will probably need 
long-term care at some point in their life, death is a certainty; so, the need 
for life insurance, not only as a bequest but to pay for burial and other 
costs, may seem more practical to someone with limited resources.  Some 
people also cite the fact that their parents died at an early age and did not 
need long-term care, while others readily admit that they are in full denial of 
the need for it.126  Taken in this context, the perceived level of uncertainty 
about needing long-term care can be a powerful force behind a decision to 
not insure against it. 
Some scholars have noted “Medicaid crowding” as a barrier to the 
growth of the private long-term care insurance industry.127  Medicaid 
crowding is a process by which the demand for private insurance decreases 
because of the expectation that Medicaid will be available to cover a 
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person’s long-term care needs when the time comes.128  A study by Jeffrey 
R. Brown and Amy Finkelstein suggests that: 
Medicaid may be able to explain the lack of private insurance purchases for 
at least two-thirds of the wealth distribution . . . This is because Medicaid 
imposes a substantial implicit tax on private long-term care insurance; for 
example, they estimate that about 60 to 75 percent of the . . . benefits that 
a median wealth individual would receive from a typical private long-term 
care insurance policy are redundant of benefits that Medicaid would have 
provided had the individual not purchased private insurance.129 
Brown and Finkelstein argue that the State Long-Term Care Partnership 
Program and the myriad of provisions of the DRA that restricted Medicaid 
resource eligibility will not increase demand for private coverage as long as 
Medicaid continues to provide the same coverage as private insurance 
provides.130  Therefore, as long as Medicaid covers long-term care, it 
greatly restricts purchases of private long-term care insurance.  Despite this 
exhaustive list of changes, demand for private long-term care insurance 
remains flat, which corroborates the assertions of the “crowd out” theory.  
Brown et al. estimate that, even if Medicaid resource requirements were 
restricted to the greatest extent possible, demand for private insurance 
would increase by only 2.7%.131  This would increase private insurance’s 
share of long-term care funding from 9% to 9.2%. 
IV.  CLASS 
In early 2010, after months of debate, Congress passed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).132  Dubbed the “Civil Rights 
Act of the 21st Century” by Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC),133 its goal is to 
expand health care coverage to almost all Americans while controlling 
health care costs and not adversely affecting the budget deficit.134  It is 
almost certainly the most significant piece of social reform legislation passed 
since Medicaid was established in 1965.  If it survives challenges in the 
courts135 and opposition from conservatives, the ACA could fundamentally 
change the role government plays in the American healthcare system. 
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Section 2406 of the ACA sets the tone for the law’s approach to long-
term care, and provides a concise and comprehensive history of long-term 
care legislation: 
Nearly 2 decades have passed since Congress seriously considered long-
term care reform.  The United States Bipartisan Commission on 
Comprehensive Health Care, also know[n] as the ‘‘Pepper Commission’’, 
released its ‘‘Call for Action’’ blueprint for health reform in September 
1990.  In the 20 years since those recommendations were made, Congress 
has never acted on the report . . .  In 1999, under the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), 
individuals with disabilities have the right to choose to receive their longterm 
services and supports in the community, rather than in an institutional 
setting . . .  Despite the Pepper Commission and Olmstead decision, the 
long-term care provided to our Nation’s elderly and disabled has not 
improved.  In fact, for many, it has gotten far worse . . .  In 2007, 69 
percent of Medicaid long-term care spending for elderly individuals and 
adults with physical disabilities paid for institutional services.  Only 6 states 
spent 50 percent or more of their Medicaid long-term care dollars on home 
and community-based services for elderly individuals and adults with 
physical disabilities while 1⁄2 of the States spent less than 25 percent.  This 
disparity continues even though, on average, it is estimated that Medicaid 
dollars can support nearly 3 elderly individuals and adults with physical 
disabilities in home and community-based services for every individual in a 
nursing home.  Although every State has chosen to provide certain services 
under home and community-based waivers, these services are unevenly 
available within and across States, and reach a small percentage of eligible 
individuals . . .  It is the sense of the Senate that . . . during the 111th 
session of Congress, Congress should address long-term services and 
supports in a comprehensive way that guarantees elderly and disabled 
individuals the care they need; and . . . long term services and supports 
should be made available in the community in addition to in institutions.136 
Title VIII of the ACA established the Community Living Assistance Services 
and Supports (“CLASS”) Act.137  CLASS was officially designated as Title XXIII 
of the Public Health Services Act (hence the provisions are listed in section 
3200, not 8000).138  Originally sponsored by Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
(D-MA),139 CLASS established the first government-sponsored long-term 
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care insurance policy.  The goals of CLASS were straightforward and very 
clearly described in Section 3201: 
(1) provide individuals with functional limitations with tools that will allow 
them to maintain their personal and financial independence and live in the 
community through a new financing strategy for community living assistance 
services and supports; (2) establish an infrastructure that will help address 
the Nation’s community living assistance services and supports needs; (3) 
alleviate burdens on family caregivers; and (4) address institutional bias by 
providing a financing mechanism that supports personal choice and 
independence to live in the community.140 
A major goal of CLASS was to discourage the use of nursing homes and 
promote more independent living in the community.141  CLASS was “a 
consumer-funded insurance pool that provides people a cash benefit to help 
with simple chores of daily living so they can remain independent.”142  
Similar to a private long-term care insurance policy, CLASS required a 
monthly premium that vested after five years.143  Once a policyholder 
developed two functional disabilities, he would qualify for a cash benefit to 
help pay for in-home care costs.144  Section 3202 states that, to become 
vested, a person would had to have paid a premium for sixty months, during 
which period he must have worked enough to earn at least one quarter of 
Social Security coverage in a three-year period.145  The premium must also 
have been paid for twenty-four consecutive months during that period if 
there was a lapse in payments of more than three months.146  These were 
significant requirements, in that they emphasized the importance of an 
enrollee being a wage earner.  This differentiated CLASS from needs-based 
programs, and made it much more akin to Social Security and Medicare, 
meaning that a person need not impoverish herself to qualify for benefits. 
Section 3203 required that the premium amounts be based on 
projections to keep CLASS solvent over the next seventy-five years.147  It also 
required reduced premiums for individuals living in poverty and for full-time 
students (as long as they remained students).148  Premiums were designed to 
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never change, although HHS reserved the right to adjust them in order to 
keep the program fiscally solvent, or if a person did not pay a premium for 
five or more consecutive years.149  Individuals who reached age sixty-five or 
paid a premium for twenty years were exempt from any premium 
increases.150  “Benefit triggers” were also established in this section.  A 
vested individual could file a claim once she was determined to be unable 
to perform at least two or three basic daily living activities (listed in Section 
3202), lacked the cognitive ability to protect herself from “threats to health 
and safety,” or had functional limitations similar to these two conditions.151  
The cash benefit began at a minimum of $50 per day (paid daily or weekly; 
Section 3205 allowed for monthly lump sums and rollovers, too) and was 
variable depending on the scale of the individual’s functional limitations.152  
For example, a person with four functional limitations would receive a 
higher cash payment than someone with two limitations.  There was no 
lifetime limit on cash benefits.153 
Section 3204 authorized employers to automatically enroll their 
employees in the CLASS program.154  Premiums would have been paid 
through payroll deductions similar to Social Security and Medicare.155  
Everyone, however, had the option to opt-out of the program if he or she 
chose.156 
Section 3205 charged HHS with developing a system for enrollees to 
apply for benefits, and for HHS to determine if they qualified.157  An enrollee 
could be considered presumptively eligible if he applied for and attested to 
being eligible for the maximum cash benefit, resided in a hospital or long-
term care facility, and expected to leave within sixty days.158  Cash benefits 
would be deposited directly into a beneficiary’s “Life Independence 
Account”159 and would be accessible via a debit card.160  Section 3205 
allowed the benefits to be spent on a variety of needs (respite care, assistive 
technology, transportation, etc.) and did not establish any concrete limits on 
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what the beneficiary may or may not buy.161  Besides a cash benefit, CLASS 
beneficiaries would also receive advocacy and assistance counseling 
services.162  An enrollee who lived in a nursing home and received Medicaid 
would receive only 5% of her CLASS benefit, with the rest going to the 
nursing home.163  Medicaid recipients who lived in home and community-
based (“HCB”) settings would keep half of their CLASS benefit, with the 
other half going to the state to pay for Medicaid.164 
Section 3206 established the CLASS Independence Fund.165  The CLASS 
Independence Fund was going to be a trust fund into which CLASS 
premiums were deposited.166  The fund was to be used only to pay out 
CLASS benefits and administrative costs.167  The U.S. Department of 
Treasury was authorized to invest money in the fund to enhance its value.168  
Section 3206 also established a Board of Trustees consisting of the 
Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
two private citizens who could not be members of the same party.169  The 
Board was intended to review the fiscal solvency of the CLASS Independence 
Fund and make annual policy recommendations regarding its use.170  
Besides the Board of Trustees, Section 3207 established the CLASS 
Independence Advisory Council, which was to be comprised of fifteen 
private citizens, “a majority of whom [would] be representatives of 
individuals who participate[d] or [we]re likely to [have] participate[d] in the 
CLASS program.”171  The Advisory Council, the members of which would be 
appointed by the President, was charged with overseeing the system and 
making its own recommendations as to premium amounts, fiscal solvency, 
and the development of the benefit plan.172 
To keep the program solvent, Section 3208 required the Secretary of 
HHS to regularly consult with the advisory council and the Board of Trustees 
“for purposes of ensuring that enrollees’ premiums [we]re adequate to 
ensure the financial solvency of the CLASS program.”173  No taxpayer 
dollars were to be used to fund CLASS, so the program would have had to 
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rely completely on the premium payments from enrollees and any returns on 
the fund’s investments to stay fiscally balanced.174  The Secretary of HHS 
was charged with submitting an annual report on the state of the CLASS 
program beginning January 1, 2014.175  Finally, information about CLASS 
was required to be added to the National Clearinghouse for Long-Term 
Care that was established in Section 6021 of the DRA.176 
V.  SIZING UP CLASS AGAINST THE INDUSTRY’S PROBLEMS 
Like all private industries, the private long-term care industry’s purpose is 
to make money.  It does not exist for the purpose of guaranteeing long-term 
care coverage for all Americans; only those who pay for it, and at a level 
commensurate with the likelihood that they will need the coverage.  Due to 
adverse selection, it is not possible for the private insurance industry to cover 
all Americans who need coverage.177  At the other end is Medicaid, which is 
designed to guarantee long-term care coverage for Americans who lack the 
income and resources to pay for it themselves.  As long as a person is 
impoverished enough to meet the eligibility requirements, that person 
cannot be denied coverage.  The cost of this program to taxpayers is not of 
primary importance.  CLASS was an attempt at a middle option.  It was 
designed to help all working Americans pay for long-term care without 
adding to the budget deficit.  The two major barriers that prevented CLASS 
from achieving this goal were the fact that the program was voluntary, and 
that it guaranteed coverage. 
The first problem to tackle is the fact that Americans are unprepared for 
their own long-term care.178  Adding CLASS to the clearinghouse of long-
term care policies was unlikely to have any effect on awareness, based on 
the findings cited above.179  The provisions of the DRA had no real effect in 
either promoting the awareness of private long-term care insurance, or even 
its use.  CLASS focused on wage earners, so it targeted the demographic 
group that seems to be the most unaware of the need for long-term care.  
Also, including CLASS premiums with Social Security and Medicare payroll 
taxes would have certainly drawn attention to the program, and therefore, 
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the issue of long-term care at large.  CLASS premiums were expected to cost 
between $160 and $240 per month.180  The fact that everyone with a 
paycheck would have been automatically enrolled181 was certain to draw 
attention.  It may seem humorous (or tragic, depending on your 
perspective), but such a shock to workers’ paychecks may have had the 
effect of starting a national debate on the issue of long-term care financing; 
one that the nation desperately needs to have. 
CLASS was not structured in a way that made it so significantly different 
than a private insurance policy in order to encourage more Americans to 
get long-term care insurance.  In fact, it may very well have resulted in 
higher premiums for its members.  Unlike Medicaid, which is fee-for-
service,182 CLASS was structured like a private long-term care indemnity 
policy.  Indemnity policies are more costly than reimbursement policies, 
which restrict the services for which the cash benefit can be used.  The 
CLASS benefit could have been used for any of the beneficiary’s needs.183  
There was no lifetime limit to CLASS benefits, which is another feature of a 
high-end LTC policy.184  There were also no “elimination periods” under 
CLASS—a rarity among private policies.185  To deal with inflation, the 
CLASS premium was to be based on projections that kept the program 
solvent for the next seventy-five years.186  Inflation protection is another 
“added feature” of private policies, which further adds to the premium 
amount.187  Therefore, CLASS was structured like a top-of-the-line long-term 
care insurance policy.  If the average LTC policy premium is $200 per 
month,188 it is not unreasonable to expect the CLASS premium to have been 
higher than that.  Moreover, enrollees would have been subsidizing 
premiums for full-time students and the poor, who were projected to pay 
only $5 per month in premiums.189  The only provisions that may have kept 
the premium amount under control were the sixty-month vesting period,190 
the requirement that all members must be wage earners during those sixty 
months,191 and automatic enrollment.192  Assuming that wage earners are 
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less likely to need long-term care, the sixty-month requirement should have 
helped to keep CLASS solvent in the short term.  Automatic enrollment 
should also have helped initially with the collection of premiums, but would 
have become less effective over time as more enrollees opted-out of the 
program.  In fact, the Congressional Budget Office projected that CLASS 
would have increased government revenues in its first ten years, and was a 
major reason why the ACA was considered deficit-neutral.193  However, 
unless HHS found a way to keep the premiums lower-than-average, 
consumers would have likely continued to believe it is in their best interests 
to invest potential premium dollars in a retirement account, instead of 
locking them into a long-term care insurance policy.194 
Enter adverse selection.  Despite automatic enrollment, there was no 
escaping the fact that the CLASS program was voluntary, which meant that 
an informed wage earner, not wanting to pay a premium, could opt-out of 
the program. 195  Participation rates in CLASS were estimated to be between 
2% and 6%.196  Individual reasons for opting-out are legion, and it is 
unlikely that the majority of the workers who refused to pay for CLASS would 
have done so because they had an alternative plan in place to pay for their 
own long-term care.197  Critics of CLASS claim that this would have created 
a system in which younger and healthier wage earners opted out of paying 
the premium, leaving the people most likely to need CLASS as the only 
enrollees.198  Since CLASS coverage was guaranteed and funded almost 
solely by premiums,199 HHS would have been obliged to cover the vested 
enrollees, so the consequences to the solvency of the program are obvious.  
The Board of Trustees of the CLASS Independence Fund would have been 
charged with ensuring that premiums for this high-end indemnity policy were 
competitive with (if not lower than) private industry premiums.200  This would 
have been balanced with the need to keep the program fiscally sound, while 
guaranteeing benefits to recipients at the same time.  The premium amounts 
were crucial to the program’s survival: 
Those who oppose the CLASS Act caution that to the extent premiums are 
set too high to attract enrollees or are raised over time to support the 
program, the program is likely to lose healthier individuals, while retaining 
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those with significant needs.  This adverse selection could jeopardize the 
long-term viability of the program.201 
Frank Keating, CEO of the American Council of Life Insurers, contended 
that “the assumption underlying [CLASS’s] financing—that a very high 
percentage of working Americans will voluntarily participate—is 
unrealistic . . . overall participation is likely to be far lower . . . potentially 
leading to very high premiums.”202  The major difference between CLASS, 
Medicare, and Medicaid is that CLASS was voluntary, and did not have 
access to taxpayer dollars.  In this respect, it was more like a private 
insurance policy than any other government-sponsored healthcare program.  
However, since CLASS guaranteed coverage to anyone who enrolled—
unlike private insurance—it appears to have had none of the protections 
necessary to prevent adverse selection. 
Without making CLASS mandatory, workers would have to have been 
convinced to enroll in the program.  There do not appear to be any 
provisions in CLASS that took into account the myriad reasons (besides the 
premium amount) why Americans avoid long-term care insurance in the first 
place.  As has already been mentioned, the automatic enrollment feature 
would certainly make workers aware of the possibility that they may 
someday need long-term care.203  However, once people opted-out of the 
program, they could go right back into the state of denial that many of them 
confess to have.204  One segment of the public states that it avoids long-
term care insurance because it does not trust insurance brokers to give them 
a fair deal.205  CLASS would have made long-term care coverage available 
to people without having to consult with brokers; however, people’s lack of 
trust in the solvency of CLASS, or in the government overall, may have 
erased any gains that could be made with this group.  There were no 
provisions in the ACA to market CLASS, and there was no evidence that 
CLASS was designed to address most Americans’ beliefs that, when given a 
choice, they would rather spend potential premium dollars on life insurance, 
retirement, their children’s inheritance, or plan for events that are inevitable, 
instead of just “possible.”206 
It is also unclear what effect CLASS would have had on the so-called 
Medicaid “crowd out” problem.  The crowd out theory asserts that, no 
matter how restrictive eligibility rules become, Medicaid will always limit the 
size of the private long-term care insurance market as long as it covers the 
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same services.207  CLASS would have added a third player to this dynamic.  
On its face, it may seem that CLASS would have further crowded out private 
insurance.  CLASS, however, was much more akin to a private policy than to 
Medicaid.  Both CLASS and private policies would have been voluntary.  A 
person chooses to buy these types of policies as part of the overall planning 
for her future.  Medicaid is a program of necessity.  It is the last resort.  
Although technically voluntary, Medicaid is needed when a person is 
impoverished and can no longer afford to pay for long-term care.  Often, it 
comes down to a choice between Medicaid and a shorter life span.  Focus 
groups and other data indicate that there is some credence to the argument 
that Americans expect the government to cover at least some of their long-
term care.208  Based on its structure, CLASS would probably have done little 
to address this condition.  “Crowd out” does not seem to be any more 
significant, however, than the numerous other reasons that are given for why 
more people do not have private coverage.209  The bottom line is that the 
cost of long-term care is incredibly high, and too few Americans buy long-
term care insurance for a number of diverse reasons.  Because of this, 
Medicaid ends up paying for more long-term care than any other funding 
source.  To prevent this problem from getting worse, policymakers must 
more aggressively address the real problem: the public’s ambivalence 
toward buying long-term care insurance. 
VI.  CREATING A CLASS PROGRAM THAT WORKS 
Since CLASS was voluntary, wage earners would have to have been 
persuaded to participate in the program to make it work.  However, CLASS 
did little in the way of changing the conditions surrounding why Americans 
tend to avoid long-term care insurance.  Since it guaranteed the equivalent 
of a high-end long-term care indemnity for all of its enrollees, it needed to 
counter-balance the costs of this provision by either taking in taxpayer 
dollars or, like health insurance under the ACA, making enrollment 
mandatory. 
Making CLASS a taxpayer-funded program like Medicaid would defeat 
the purpose of the program, much of which was to decrease the number 
people relying on the government to pay for long-term care and thus reduce 
the budget deficit and the overall burden of the program on taxpayers.  
CLASS was a fundamental alternative to Medicaid.  Moreover, opposition to 
CLASS as just another “big government entitlement program” was 
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significant.210  In 2009, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to 
Majority Leader Harry Reid requesting that CLASS be removed from the 
ACA.211  The letter states: “We have grave concerns that the real effect of 
the provisions would be to create a new federal entitlement program with 
large, long-term spending increases that far exceed revenues.”212  In 
addition to the problem of cost, it may have been easy for an opponent of 
CLASS to convince voters that it was an ostensible tax increase, and a 
hostile, or even a frugal Congress could have chipped away at its provisions 
over time. 
In reviewing the effectiveness of CLASS, it is clear that the automatic 
enrollment requirement addressed the problems facing long-term care 
insurance in the United States more than any other provision in the law.  It is 
the compulsory nature of this requirement that would have made it effective.  
However, since enrollees could opt-out of CLASS, automatic enrollment 
would have lost its effectiveness over the long-run and made the program 
vulnerable to opposition.  A simple amendment to a bill stating that wage 
earners are not automatically enrolled in CLASS could have been 
devastating for the program’s financial condition and effectiveness.  
Therefore, to eliminate this vulnerability, CLASS enrollment would have to be 
mandatory. 
Overall, the ACA is about guaranteeing health care coverage for as 
many Americans as possible.  The law succinctly states that “each health 
insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or 
group market in a State must accept every employer and individual in the 
State that applies for such coverage.”213  Various other clauses of the ACA 
protect policyholders from being rejected for pre-existing conditions,214 
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lifetime limits on coverage,215 and excessive premiums and deductibles to 
name a few. 216  Medicaid eligibility is expanded to include everyone under 
age 65 with income less than 133% of the federal poverty level.217  Most 
Americans with incomes above that amount who do not have employer-
sponsored insurance will be able to get subsidized premiums for health 
plans through the exchange system.218  In response to this vast expansion of 
coverage, Chapter 48 of the ACA establishes the “Requirement to Maintain 
Minimum Essential Coverage,”219 commonly known as the individual 
mandate.  Effective January 1, 2014, anyone who goes without “minimum 
essential health care coverage” for a month or more will pay a tax penalty 
of up to $750 per person (with a limit at $2,250) on an annual basis.220  If 
it survives in the courts,221 this penalty will be phased in and will be fully 
effective after 2016.222  Exceptions are made to take into account 
incarcerated individuals, people whose religious beliefs preclude them from 
getting health insurance, illegal immigrants, heads of household under age 
18, and individuals claiming a hardship exemption.223  The purpose of the 
health care mandate is described very clearly in Section 1501: 
if there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase 
health insurance until they needed care.  By significantly increasing health 
insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of 
this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health 
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health 
insurance premiums.  The requirement is essential to creating effective 
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that 
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are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions 
can be sold.224 
This clause alone makes it very clear that the framers of the ACA were 
concerned about adverse selection when they guaranteed health insurance 
coverage for all Americans.  It also makes it disturbingly clear that CLASS 
was unlikely to stay fiscally solvent without a coverage mandate of its own. 
A coverage mandate would bluntly address Americans’ lack of 
preparation for their own long-term care.  All working Americans would 
have guaranteed long-term care insurance once they were fully vested in the 
program.  Moreover, since the program was funded almost exclusively by 
premiums, people were less likely to view it as “welfare,” and more likely to 
view it as a program similar to Medicare and Social Security.  With the 
mandate in place, the structure of CLASS might have worked to its 
advantage.  Premium payers were exclusively wage earners, most of whom 
are at a lower risk to need long-term care.  The CBO estimated that CLASS 
enrollees would not start taking out benefits in a substantive way for at least 
ten years from the program’s inception.225  Having an abundance of 
premium payers early on would enhance the program’s fiscal solvency, and 
should have allowed it to charge lower premiums, possibly as low as $37 
per month.226  This not only addresses the ubiquitous complaint that long-
term care insurance is too expensive,227 but it also would allow CLASS to 
stay structured like a high-end indemnity policy for a much longer period of 
time.  The mandate would also weaken the argument that a person is better 
off putting potential premium dollars into a retirement fund, since premium 
payments may drop low enough to make long-term care insurance a more 
practical option.  Most importantly, a mandate would address the adverse 
selection problem. As the ACA points out, when health care coverage is 
guaranteed, it must be counter-balanced with a mandate.228  The only other 
alternative is to limit coverage or fund the program with tax dollars, both of 
which defeat the purpose of the program.  The mandate also eliminates the 
denial and uncertainty problems that Americans have with long-term care 
insurance planning. 
This leaves the “Medicaid crowding” problem.  The primary principle 
behind this theory is that, as long as Medicaid covers the same service that 
long-term care insurance covers, the long-term care insurance industry will 
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be weaker.229  Even without a mandate, the Congressional Budget Office 
“projected the CLASS program to generate $2 billion in Medicaid 
savings.”230  Clearly, mandatory participation in CLASS would augment this 
savings and insure a huge portion of the population against long-term care 
costs.  Modifying the mandate to require long-term care insurance under a 
choice of CLASS or private insurance would, by definition, reduce the 
crowding problem.  The experience of other countries supports this notion. 
Mandatory CLASS-style long-term care policies exist in other countries 
and appear to be successful in meeting both their social and fiscal goals.  
Germany’s program is entirely comprehensive, and includes a choice of 
nursing home, HCB care, or cash benefit coverage.231  There is no longer 
any “Medicaid” coverage of these services as it is known in the United 
States.232 Germany has a dedicated fund similar to the CLASS 
Independence Fund, although “everyone (including employers)” contributes 
to it, not just wage-earning volunteers.233  If a person does not want to 
contribute to the government program, he must buy private long-term care 
insurance.234  When given the choice of these three options, the cash benefit 
is the most popular.235  Although the benefits of cash payments amount to 
less than those of HCB, they are sufficient enough to enable an otherwise-
unpaid caregiver to provide care as often as she needs to.236  Some 
caregivers even get vacation time and are able to use the cash benefit to 
hire a personal attendant.237  Therefore, the German system has been at 
least somewhat effective in turning the role of unpaid caregiver into a form 
of employment.  The options available to citizens are also well-integrated, 
so people can choose between hybrids of cash, HCB services, and nursing 
home care.238  Perhaps most importantly, the German model has no 
resource or income guidelines, so individuals do not have to impoverish 
themselves to qualify for coverage. 239  This applies to all of the types of 
care, not just the cash benefit.240  Finally, the German system is fiscally 
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solvent, although continued reforms are necessary to keep it solvent in the 
coming decades.241  Japan’s system is similar to Germany’s, but does not 
include a cash option.242  Providers of long-term care under the German 
and Japanese systems are overwhelmingly private entities,243 so, despite 
what some commentators may call a “socialist” model of coverage, a 
successful private-public partnership has been established.  Other nations, 
like Britain,244 France,245 and the Netherlands,246 have similar systems: the 
long-term care coverage is comprehensive, mandatory, and, with the 
exception of Britain,247 does not have impoverishing eligibility 
requirements.248 
The United States does not have to create a coverage system as 
elaborate as those in Europe and Japan to effectively address the problem 
of long-term care.  Similar to the ACA, it could rely on private firms to 
provide the policies, while instituting a mandate for everyone to have long-
term care insurance.  CLASS could even be reformed into a “minimal 
coverage” program into which people would be enrolled if they did not get 
coverage on their own. The mandate, however, is what makes any of this 
possible. Scholarly commentary on CLASS had only just begun when the 
program was eliminated, but the consensus of those studying the program 
was that it would be largely ineffective without a mandate.249 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Long-term care is unique.  As much as it is an issue for the person 
getting the care, it is an issue for someone else: a loved one, a friend, an 
attendant, a nurse, a physician, a neighbor.  It is a public charge, almost 
exclusively funded by the care recipient’s family or by taxpayers.250  No one 
wants it.  It also seems, at times, that no one wants to address the 
challenges faced by an aging nation that will need more and more of it as 
the 21st Century progresses.  There are, however, reasons to be optimistic.  
Democrats and Republicans both understand that there is a problem 
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funding long-term care.  The conservative DRA attempted to address the 
problem and was not successful, but scholars have since been able to 
identify reasons why that was the case.  The progressive ACA took significant 
steps toward reforming the American long-term care system through the 
CLASS Act.  CLASS, however, was fundamentally flawed and was unlikely to 
remain fiscally solvent.  A long-term care insurance mandate, similar to the 
ACA’s health insurance mandate, would have given the program the vitality 
it needed to be effective.  Perhaps more ambitious reforms, like those seen 
in Germany and other countries, will be attainable in the future.  However, 
for now we are in a position to keep moving in that direction.  In spite of the 
vitriol in politics these days, the inexorable march of time is still powerful 
enough to make Republicans and Democrats work together toward a 
common goal, particularly with the public debt expanding at ever-growing 
rates.  After all, all of us want to live a long time, and, sooner or later, we 
will all have to pay the price of age. 
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